In 2007 a Free Trade Area (BFTA) will be created in the Balkans. In this paper we study the potential impact of BFTA on trade growth in the SEE. Given that welfare impacts associated with trade growth depend on the growth channels, more goods and varieties exported or at higher price or higher volume of goods and varieties are exported, in this paper we investigate the structure of integration-induced export growth in the Balkans. The empirical implementation of our analysis is complicated by the fact that …rm-level trade data is not available for the SEE economies. In order to cope with this data paucity, we adopt a heterogeneous …rm framework, which allows us to decompose the aggregate trade growth in two parts: the intensive margin of trade and the extensive margin of trade using only aggregate trade data. The empirical …nd-ings of our study suggest that the BFTA would primarily trigger trade growth through a growing number of exported goods (the extensive margin of trade). Thus, the actual welfare gains from trade growth in the Balkans might be larger than predicted by previous trade studies. We also found that a variable trade cost reduction would lead to higher export growth rates compared to a …xed trade cost reduction. These results allow us to draw detailed policy conclusions.
Introduction
Since the early 1990s, the countries of South Eastern Europe (SEE) 1 have been reforming their centrally planned economies to be more market oriented. In contrast
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to the Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies, the transition process in the Balkan peninsula has been considerably delayed and complicated by internal uprisings and the outbreak of civil wars in the beginning of the nineties. The civil wars in the Balkans began in 1991 and lasted for almost a decade.
The Balkan wars were characterised by armed con ‡icts between di¤erent ethnic groups of the former Yugoslavia (Stubos and Tsikripis 2007) . According to Stubos and Tsikripis, the armed con ‡icts in the Balkans had their roots not only in the historical-cultural and religious tensions, but also in socio-economic problems. As a result, in addition to the humanitarian tragedy, the civil wars in the Balkans brought also a major deterioration in the SEE economic performance. The development of the SEE foreign trade was determined by collapse of the Yugoslav internal market and withering of the Socialist bloc external markets (Stubos and Tsikripis 2007) . In addition, the political independence movements of the former Yugoslav republics set loose a wave of protectionism in the newly established states in the Balkans. All these factors together led to a sharp decline in foreign trade openness during the years of the Balkan wars, which resulted in rapidly declining foreign trade volumes. For example, the share of external trade in the SEE's GDP declined from 93% in 1990 to 54% in 1995 (Eurostat 2005) . 2 The Balkan wars ended in 1999 with much of the SEE economies reduced to poverty and economic disruption. 3 At the same time, the end of the civil wars created favourable circumstances for a new attempt of building social, economic and political stability in the Balkans. For example, the growing political stability, together with trade policy liberalisation measures, created favourable circumstances for foreign trade and foreign direct investment in the Balkans. As a result, in the post-war years the SEE external trade increased rapidly -75% between 1994 and 2004 (Eurostat 2005) .
Although, trade policy liberalisation was an important factor, which signi…cantly contributed to foreign trade growth in the post-war period, these extraordinary high growth rates in Balkan foreign trade cannot solely be associated with the trade policy liberalisation measures. Other factors, such as the end of the civil wars in the Balkans, an improvement in the implementation and application of laws, a decrease in corruption, better management of basic public infrastructures and institutions, have also contributed to better functioning of markets and, hence, to trade growth. In this study we refer to all these factors together as trade freeness à la Head and Mayer (2004) , which according to Figure 1 in section 4.3, have considerably increased since the end of the civil wars in the Balkans.
Considering the SEE's foreign trade policy, which signi…cantly contributed to in-creased trade freeness in the Balkans since the end of the civil wars, we can distinguish two phases: (i) bilateral trade agreements (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) ; and (ii) a single free trade area in the Balkans (2007-). In the context of the present study we can call the …rst phase the bilateral phase and the second phase the FTA phase. The …rst (bilateral) phase was commenced in 1999, right after end of the civil wars in the Balkans, when eight SEE economies signed the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. The SEE Stability Pact was an expression of strengthening e¤orts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity. Among other things, the Pact provides a framework for stimulating regional co-operation and economic integration. The SEE Stability Pact became operational in June 2001, 4 when the SEE countries agreed to implement bilateral Free Trade Agreements in order to develop their mutual trade and promote economic integration in the region. During the bilateral phase of trade policy liberalisation in the Balkans, the eight SEE economies have concluded a series of additional bilateral Free Trade Agreements with a goal of expanding regional trade and thereby promoting growth, investment and employment in the Balkan region. As a result, at the end of the bilateral phase there was a network of 31 bilateral Free Trade Agreements.
Based on these …ndings and the Eurostat ( 2005) data we can summarise the bilateral phase as follows: (i) since the end of the civil wars in the Balkans, trade freeness has increased considerably; (ii) foreign trade policy mainly consisted of bilateral free trade agreements; (iii) increased trade freeness induced sizeable trade growth in the Balkans; (iv) both types of trade ‡ows are observed in the SEE trade data: positive for some products and some country pairs and zero trade ‡ows for other products and other country pairs; (v) the empirical trade data for the SEE provide a strong evidence of intra-industry trade.
Preparations for the second (FTA) phase started in June 2005, when the SEE economies have agreed to work towards transforming the current network of bilateral Free Trade Agreements into a single regional free trade agreement. In July 2006 the SEE countries decided that the Balkan Free Trade Agreement will be fully implemented in 2007. The BFTA should simultaneously enlarge and amend the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) to include all SEE economies and update it by including e¤ective trade provisions.
Overall, the FTA phase is much less researched and its impacts are still largely unknown. With respect to the proposed BFTA, many questions arise. Will the SEE foreign trade continue to grow after the BFTA? What will be the impact of BFTA on trade growth rates? How exactly the trade growth will occur -will trade liberalisation increase the export volume and value of existing …rms or give incentives for more …rms to enter foreign markets and start exporting? Given that empirical knowledge about BFTA impact on trade in the Balkans is in an early stage, in this study we are interested in this second -FTA phase. The main goal of this paper is to analyse the BFTA-induced export growth in the SEE.
The paper is structured as follows. After providing an overview of historical development patterns and institutional settings in the SEE countries, we outline the evolution of foreign trade among SEE economies in the Balkans. Next, we review the most recent …ndings of international trade literature, where an increasing number of empirical studies are interested not only in the volume but also in the structure of trade growth. In section 3 we introduce the theoretical framework, which will be used in the empirical analysis. Our analysis is based on a monopolistic competition trade model, which allows to analyse the structure of trade growth based only on aggregate trade data. The second step in our analysis involves parameter estimation. This is done by deriving empirically estimable equations of trade ‡ows and trade costs from the theoretical trade model and estimating the two equations. The resulting estimates provide numerical values of structural parameters for the underlying theoretical trade model. Finally, in section 5 we use the estimated parameters and statistical data to empirically implement the theoretical model and to make detailed predictions about the structure of export growth induced by the BFTA. Based on these results in section 6 we draw policy conclusions and sketch avenues for future research.
Empirical evidence
In this section we review previous empirical and theoretical trade literature, which o¤ers useful insights for empirical analysis of trade growth. This allows us to establish several important …ndings about international trade ‡ows. First, according to recent empirical research on the structure of commodities trade, aggregate trade ‡ows are composed of several components and, with detailed enough data, changes in each of these components can be separately traced. Second, …rm-level trade studies have identi…ed several notable features of exporters that are overlooked in international macroeconomic literature, but might be relevant for the present study. These …ndings are relevant for selecting an appropriate theoretical framework for the present study.
De…ning trade ‡ows and trade growth
The trade literature uses a sizeable number of trade-speci…c terms, such as trade value, trade volume, trade ‡ows, trade growth, intensive and extensive margins of trade. Sometimes, di¤erent terms are used to describe the same economic variables or growth processes, and vice-versa. In order to facilitate the understanding of our analysis and comparison with other studies, we start the literature review by de…ning key terms, which we consistently use throughout the paper. Given that in this study we focus on export ‡ows and export growth, we de…ne key terms used in export literature. The structure of import ‡ows can be de…ned and analysed analogously.
Usually in empirical trade literature (e.g. Anderson and Wincoop 2003) the total value of exports, E od , from exporting country o to importing country d is de…ned as the number of shipments, N od , times the average value per shipment, e od :
Hummels and Klenow (2005) show that the decomposition of aggregate trade growth can be performed along the same lines, i.e., trade growth can be decomposed into two components. First, the incumbent …rms adjust their volume of exports, i.e. the intensive margin measures trade growth within product lines. According to Hummels and Klenow (2005) terminology, the intensive margin, e od , captures the trade growth within product lines. 5 Second, the number of traded varieties (traded goods) change (increase). Analogously, Hummels and Klenow label the trade growth that can be attributed to a larger number of traded varieties, N od , as the extensive margin of trade.
In the context of empirical studies, which we review in the following section, we also need to de…ne the ratios of …rms. The exporter ratio is de…ned as the ratio of exporters over the number of all …rms. The starter ratio is de…ned as the ratio of new …rms, which enter foreign markets and start export to export, over the number of all exporting …rms. Analogously, the stopper ratio is de…ned as the ratio of exporters that switch to non-exporter status to the number of last period exporters. Given that the starter and stopper ratios can be considered as the transition probabilities in export status, a higher starter ratio than stopper ratio does not necessarily mean that the exporter ratio is increasing all the time. Unless explicitly mentioned, all ratios are measured per year.
Empirical evidence: the dual margin
Early trade literature looked mainly at aggregate trade ‡ows and trade growth. In more recent years the identi…cation of the two components of aggregate trade ‡ows (extensive and intensive margins) have attracted a considerable amount of research attention. Di¤erent strands of the international trade literature using di¤erent theoretical frameworks have all contributed. Identi…cation of the intensive trade margin has most frequently been studied in plant-level trade studies. The extensive margin of trade has attracted a considerable amount of research attention in studies analysing di¤erences between exporting …rms (exporters) and local sellers (non-exporters). In this section we review main …ndings of the most recent international trade literature with a view of …nding an appropriate analytical framework for the present study.
Several recent empirical trade studies using …rm-level trade data report that the sets of exporters, goods and sectors change over time and vary more than has traditionally been assumed. For example, using annual data of Colombian manufacturing Census 1981 -1989 Roberts and Tybout (1997) …nd that on average, the starter and stopper ratios are about 3.3% and 11.5%, respectively with the average exporter ratio of 11.8%. Similarly, Bernard and Wagner (1998) use annual manufacturing plantlevel data 1978 -1992 in Lower Saxony, Germany and …nd that, on average, ratios of …rms entering and exiting exporting were about 4.14% and 5.51%, respectively with the average exporter ratio of 41.2%.
Subsequent research by Bernard and Jensen (1999) suggests that exporters di¤er in the variety of goods that they trade and also in the range of countries they trade with. Using detailed data from individual plants for the entire US manufacturing sector Bernard and Jensen decompose sources of the US export boom in the late 1980s and early 1990s. They …nd that the preponderance of the increase in exports came from increasing export intensity at …rms that were already exporting, but a non-negligible share came from …rms that switched between only selling locally to selling both locally and abroad. This …nding again indicates that a sizable share of new trade is in the form of new goods not previously traded.
Using the U.S. Census Bureau's Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) 1986 -1992 Bernard et al (2003) show that the ratio of non-exporters that transition to exporter status to the number of last period non-exporters, which they term the starter ratio, is about 14.4% per year. The ratio of exporters that switch to nonexporter status to the number of last period exporters, the stopper ratio, is about 12.2% on average per year. The dynamics of export status result in changes in the ratio of exporters among all …rms over time. The starter ratio is slightly higher than stopper ratio and the average exporter ratio is about 51.8%. These results again indicate the prevalence of the extensive margin of trade.
Kehoe and Ruhl (2002) have obtained similar results in a somewhat di¤erent setting. Kehoe and Ruhl provide one of the most detailed analysis of the changing extensive margin in the wake of bilateral trade integration by studying trade integrations in 18 countries and show how substantial increases in the extensive margin coincide with trade integration. They investigate the importance of the extensive and intensive margins in six major trade integration periods: the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal to the European Community, the Canada -USA Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA), the implementation of the Single Market Programme and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Using detailed data on international trade ‡ows by commodity, they …nd signi…cant evidence of trade adjustments through the extensive margin. Kehoe and Ruhl (2002) also …nd that the initially 'least traded' product categories experienced the largest increases in export shares following trade integration, which is a strong evidence of the extensive margin of trade.
Hillberry They …nd that a model with heterogeneous …rms that gives rise to variable extensive and intensive margins is a reasonably accurate description of actual French trade patterns. The authors show that variations in aggregate French exports are mostly due to a change in the number of …rms, which export to foreign markets. However, the dominance of the extensive margin is most visible, when the variation of aggregate trade ‡ows is due to a change in trade costs, for given market sizes of destination countries. Eaton et al also analyse the decomposition of trade growth at the industry level and …nd that aggregate features emphasising the prevalence of the extensive margin do not di¤er signi…cantly across sectors.
Hillberry and Hummels (2005) is one of the few studies which analyse the structure of intra-national trade ‡ows. They investigate how U.S. domestic trade ‡ows vary with distance, using the 1997 Commodity Flow Survey. Hillberry and Hummels show that distance reduces aggregate domestic ‡ows mostly through a reduction in the number of trade ‡ows: at the sample mean distance, the extensive margin represents 62% of the elasticity of aggregate trade ‡ows with respect to distance.
Hummels and Klenow (2005) study the response of the intensive and extensive margins on country-level trade, relying on a de…nition of the margins based on the variation of exporting countries'sizes. They analyse exports in 1995 from 110 countries to 59 importers and decompose the greater trade of larger economies into contributions from the intensive and extensive margins of trade. In addition, they compare prices and quantities of exports by di¤erent countries to given market-categories and estimate quality di¤erences across exporters. The main …nding of Hummels and Klenow is that the extensive margin accounts for two-thirds of greater exports of larger economies, and one-third of greater imports of smaller economies. For both imports and exports, larger economies trade in more categories and trade with more partners. Richer countries export more units at higher prices, therefore producing a higher quality, and exporting mainly at the 'quality'(extensive) margin.
Empirical evidence: the heterogeneity of …rms
The second key …nding about the international trade ‡ows which results from previous …rm-level studies concerns heterogeneity of exporting …rms. The main …nding of these studies is that only few …rms export, and among exporters, only few …rms export to more than a few countries. Most exporters only sell a small fraction of their output abroad. These results are in sharp contrast to gravity models with homogenous …rms, where every …rm sells in every region/country.
Another …nding of the …rm-level studies is that exporters are di¤erent from non exporters, moreover, they are di¤erent in many respects. Usually, they are much larger and are more productive as well as more capital intensive than …rms selling all output locally. Several studies have also found that having exported in the past signi…cantly increases the probability of a …rm exporting today. Bernard and Jensen (1999), for example, found that a …rm exporting today is 36% more likely to export in the future than a …rm not exporting today. This result imply that exporting and nonexporting …rms are much more heterogeneous than used to assume in representative …rm models.
The third …nding, which is relevant for our study, is the evidence of export entry costs. Several …rm-level studies found a signi…cant evidence for the presence of sunk costs associated with exporting. Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Bernard et al (2003) all report substantial evidence of …xed entry costs into foreign markets. By accounting for …xed trade costs Evenett and Venables (2002) could explain the many zeros (nontraded varieties) in bilateral trade data. Evenett and Venables also document that the number of non-traded varieties has substantially dropped over time. This suggests that a reduction in …xed costs or growth of income can play an important role in accounting for the growth of world trade. Evenett and Venables (2002) …nd that the removal of zeros accounts for one third of developing countries'export growth since 1970. These empirical …ndings highlight the relevance of …xed costs associated with exporting.
Findings of previous trade studies discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.3 can be summarised as follows: (i) aggregate trade growth usually occurs through two channels: previously non-traded goods become traded and new …rms start exporting; and existing exporters increase their export volume of goods and varieties already exported; (ii) those producers that export their goods abroad signi…cantly di¤er from non-exporters (higher productivity, higher levels of output, and more capital intensive); and (iii) entering export markets is associated with entry costs, which are sunk after entry decision.
Theoretical framework
There are several methodological approaches for decomposing aggregate trade ‡ows. The most straightforward is to use …rm-level data for prices, quantities and the number of shipments. Unfortunately, such data is not available for the SEE post-war economies in the Balkans. Thus, this approach is not suitable for the SEE. Data limitations in the SEE require an analytical approach which would allow us to infer di¤erential changes in the extensive and intensive margins in the pattern of trade growth using only aggregate trade volume data. In fact, given that we are interested in decomposing the SEE bilateral trade ‡ows in to only two components (extensive and intensive margins), we need to identify either one. The other trade margin could then be calculated as a residual from aggregate trade ‡ows, which are available in the SEE trade data.
Identi…cation of the intensive trade margin is rather involved, as we would need data for both prices and quantities of exported goods. Identi…cation of the extensive trade margin requires information about the number of traded varieties, which for most manufactured goods is equal to the number of exporting …rms. If all …rms in country o would export to country d, we could use the Krugman's (1980) monopolistic competition trade model. However, according to empirical trade data for SEE, both types of trade ‡ows are observed in the Balkans: positive trade ‡ows for some products and some country pairs and zero trade ‡ows for other products and other country pairs (Eurostat 2005 ). Thus, the Krugman's (1980) model is not suitable for SEE. A data-undemanding analysis of trade structure in the Balkans requires an approach, where exporting …rms is a subset of the total number of …rms in country o, which is both sector and destination-speci…c.
Melitz (2003) extended the Krugman's (1980) model by assuming that …rms in country o are heterogenous according to their productivity and only the most productive ones export to country d. Separation of exporting …rms from non-exporters à la Melitz 's (2003) requires statistical data for …rm distribution and information about the threshold productivity above which …rms export to d. The …rm productivity distribution is set arbitrarily, usually it is assumed to be Pareto (Melitz 2003) . The threshold productivity (exporting threshold) can be determined from the export entry cost. The Melitz 's (2003) model would allow us to identify the number of exporting …rms from country o to country d (extensive margin), from the aggregate trade data. The downside of the Melitz (2003) approach is that it requires more parameters and several additional assumptions about …rm heterogeneity, …rm distribution and export entry costs. The …rst assumption of productivity heterogeneity of …rms …nds indeed strong evidence in …rm-level data, which we discussed in the previous two sections. In particular, …rm-level empirical evidence suggests that those producers that export their goods abroad di¤er from non-exporters along several dimensions: exporters tend to have higher productivity, higher levels of output, and use more capital and labour inputs. The second assumption about distribution of …rm heterogeneity is little researched and, therefore, is subject to sensitivity analysis. The third assumption of export entry cost …nds strong support in the empirical trade data. All studies discussed in the previous two sections …nd strong evidence of …xed market entry costs associated with exporting abroad.
In this section we introduce the theoretical framework of our study, which is largely based on the Melitz 's (2003) model, 6 which in turn is an extension of the Krugman's (1980) model of trade with monopolistic competition and increasing returns. We start by introducing the basic ingredients of Melitz 's model: de…ning preferences and technologies and characterising the optimal strategies of both …rms and consumers in partial equilibrium. Next, by determining the selection of …rms into local producers and exporters, we are able to compute the global general equilibrium. As in Melitz (2003) , the selection among exporters and non-exporters is based on the assumptions that …rms are heterogeneous and exporters face …xed costs associated with entering foreign markets, implying that less productive …rms are not able to generate enough revenue abroad to cover the …xed costs of entering foreign markets. Thus, according to the Melitz 's (2003) model, exporters are only a subset of domestic …rms and this subset of exporters varies with characteristics of foreign markets. This type of sorting mechanism is indeed in line with empirical …ndings, which we have established in the previous section, i.e. exporters are more pro…table than non-exporters. We may conclude that the Melitz 's (2003) model can be applied for studying trade growth in the SEE transition economies under reasonable assumptions.
As in the Melitz 's (2003) model there are R countries that produce goods using only labour. Country r has a total labour force L r . All countries have access to the same technologies. There are two types of sectors: one traditional sector, A, and one manufacturing industry, X. Given the trade focus of our analysis we assume that all manufacturing goods can be traded among all countries. The 'traditional' sector produces a homogenous 'traditional'good under perfect competition, constant returns to scale with unit labour requirement. As usual, the 'traditional' sector is immobile, and the 'traditional'good is assumed to be traded freely at zero trade cost. It serves as a numeraire in our model, therefore, its price is normalised to 1. Given that every country produces the homogenous good and the homogenous good is set as a numeraire, wages are equalised to unity in every country.
The manufacturing industry supplies a continuum of di¤erentiated goods and, as usual in monopolistic competition models, each …rm is a monopolist for the variety it produces. Manufacturing goods face positive trade costs. As in Melitz (2003), we assume two types of trade costs: variable trade cost and …xed trade cost. In contrast to Melitz 's model, which assumes that a …rm has …rst to pay a …xed cost to survive at home and then it has to pay a …xed cost for entering export markets, we assume that all …rms have to pay only one …xed cost for entering any market. This adjustment, which considerably reduces the …xed cost data requirements, is required to make the empirical implementation of the model feasible in the SEE transition economies, where no comparable …xed cost data is available. Although, the two di¤erent entry costs in the Melitz 's (2003) model might more precisely describe …rms dynamics, they o¤er little additional insights in the behaviour of exporters, which is the main focus of the present study.
Preferences and technology
We start the formal description of the model with consumer preferences. We assume that the produced goods are consumed by workers, which are the only consumers. All consumers have identical CES preferences over traditional and manufacturing goods. A consumer that consumes C A units of the homogenous good, x j units of each variety j of the manufacturing good, and N varieties of the di¤erentiated manufacturing good achieves total utility U :
where x is the elasticity of substitution between manufacturing varieties and is consumer demand parameter determining expenditure shares, with x > 1 and
There are two types of trade costs for shipping manufacturing goods from origin country o and selling in destination country d: variable trade cost, od and …xed trade cost, F C od . The variable trade cost are of 'iceberg' form: if one unit of the di¤erentiated manufacturing good is shipped from origin country o to destination country d, only fraction 1 od arrives at d. Following Samuelson (1954), we assume that the rest melts on the way. The higher is , the higher is the variable trade cost. The second type of trade cost manufacturing …rms face are export entry costs, which do not depend on the quantity sold abroad. If a …rm in country o exports to country d, it must pay a …xed cost F C od . These costs include foreign marketing and distribution costs, bureaucratic procedures on the border, and required changes in product characteristics to match up to the tastes of foreign consumers and government regulations. The presence of …xed cost in the di¤erentiated manufacturing sector gives rise to increasing returns to scale production technology. By abstracting from additional domestic production entry costs allows us to focus on export entry and exit decisions of …rms.
Assuming that each manufacturing …rm draws a random unit labour productivity ', a …rm from country o with productivity ' has the following cost of producing x units of manufacturing good x and selling it in country d: c (x) = x ' + F C od . As usual in the monopolistic competition framework, …rms are price setters. Given that demand functions are iso-elastic, the optimal price charged in country d by …rm j from country o is a constant mark-up over the unit cost (including the transportation cost):
where p od is price of the manufacturing variety produced in region o and sold in region d. The restriction > 1 ensures that the output price, p o , is always positive.
Furthermore, we assume that the total mass of …rms is proportional to country's endowment with labour force, L r . 7 As in Melitz (2003), we assume that …rms draw the productivity from a Pareto distribution with scaling parameter and that …rm productivity is distributed according to P (' < ') = F (') = 1 ' , with dF (') = 'd' for ' 1. Variable is an inverse measure of …rm heterogeneity in the manufacturing sector, with > 2 and > 1. 8 Sectors with lower are more heterogeneous, in the sense that more output is concentrated among the largest and most productive …rms.
Equilibrium
As in Melitz (2003), we assume that each …rm in every country chooses a strategy, taking strategies of all other …rms and all consumers as given. A strategy for a …rm is both a subset of countries, where to sell its output and prices to set for its goods in each market. A strategy for a consumer is the quantity to consume of each variety of every good available domestically, given its price. From the optimal strategies of …rms and consumers in every country, we can subsequently compute the global general equilibrium. The global trade equilibrium is characterised by a set of prices and quantities that correspond to a …xed point of the best response graph of each agent.
Given the optimal pricing strategy of …rms and the optimal demand strategy of consumers, we can derive …rm exports, e od , from origin country o to destination country d:
where ' is …rm-speci…c productivity and P d is price index of horizontally di¤er-entiated manufacturing goods in destination country d. If only those …rms above the productivity threshold ' rd from country o would export to country d, then the ideal price index, P d , in country d can be de…ned as follows:
As long as net pro…ts generated by exports to country d are su¢ cient to cover …xed entry cost, F C od , …rms will be willing to export to country d. The pro…ts earned by …rm n in country o from exporting to country d are then given by:
where r od (') is …rm revenue from selling in country d. As in Melitz (2003) , the productivity threshold, ' od , corresponds to productivity of the least productive …rm in country o, for which gross pro…ts earned in country d are just enough to cover the …xed costs of entering market d:
with 1 a constant. 9 We assume that trade barriers are always high enough to ensure that 8 j, r, ' od > 1.
10
Consumer prices in destination country d depend on country characteristics. More precisely, they are increasing in trade costs decreasing in market size. From equation (8) we can calculate the set of …rms that export to country d. Because of the selection that takes place among exporters, this set (…rms exporting to country d) only depends on country d's characteristics and trade costs.
By de…nition, the price index in country d is given by:
Plugging the productivity threshold from equation (8) into price index (9), we can solve for the general equilibrium price index, P d : 1 . 10 This assumption is well supported by the empirical research using …rm-level data, e.g. from the U.S. Census Bureau's Annual Survey of Manufacturers. where 2 is constant 11 and
is an aggregate index of d's remoteness from the rest of the world. 12 It is similar to the 'multilateral resistance variable'introduced by Anderson and Wincoop (2003) . In addition to their measure, it takes into account the impact of …xed costs and the impact of …rm heterogeneity on prices.
Firm heterogeneity has a direct impact on the average productivity of exporters in the destination market, d. Larger and more integrated markets attract more …rms, and the new …rms that enter foreign markets are typically less productive. These new entrants lower the average productivity of suppliers. Equations (7) and (10) 
where ' is constant. 13 According to equation (11), countries that are expensive for exporting …rms to enter (F C od large), far away ( od large), or which have a small market (L d low), attract only the most productive exporters. If country d is far away from its trading partners ( d large), it is harder for exporting …rms to compete, implying that only the most productive …rms from country o are able to enter country d. According to equation (11) variable trade cost, od , with elasticity one is the major determinant of the average productivity of exporters in the destination market, d.
Trade
In the previous section we have solved for price indices of tradable goods in every country. In this section we use the general equilibrium price index to solve for …rm level exports and the exporting productivity threshold. The expression for …rm level exports, which we obtain in this section di¤ers from neoclassical models of trade in homogeneous goods. Moreover, because of the two simplifying assumptions which we have made at the beginning, they also di¤er from Melitz (2003) implying that the results we obtain in this section are not directly comparable to the Melitz 's model. While in Melitz 's model …rm level exports depend on both domestic and exporting productivities, in our model, which is similar to Chaney 2007, …rm level exports only depend on exporting productivity. As a result, we are able to derive closed 1 . 12 A simple way to interpret this aggregate index is to look at a symmetrical case:
. In asymmetric cases, d is a weighted average of bilateral trade costs. 
form solutions of intensive and extensive margins, which are important for empirical analysis of the present study. By plugging the general equilibrium price index from equation (10) into the demand function and into the productivity threshold (8), we obtain general equilibrium exports, e od ('), from origin country o to destination country d:
the productivity threshold ' od above which …rms from o export to d, is given by
where 3 and 4 are constants. 14 According to equation (12), …rm exports are determined by the countries'relative size, L d , bilateral trade barriers, F C od and od , and the d's remoteness from the rest of the world, d . Individual …rm exports depend on the transportation cost, od , with elasticity 1 and on the size of the destination market, L d , with elasticity 1 , which is less than one, because of the impact of market size and because of the impact of price competition. Both elasticities are smaller than the corresponding elasticities of aggregate trade, because aggregate trade volume depends also on the number of exporters, N od , which is de…ned as follows:
where E is a constant. 15 According to equation (14) , the number of …rms, N od , reacts to changes in unit trade costs, od , with an elasticity of , and to changes in the size of origin and destination countries, L r , with elasticity 1, which is close to the values recovered from the …rm-level trade data (see section 4).
According to the de…nition of E od , which is given in equation (1), aggregate exports (f.o.b.) from origin country o to destination country d can be decomposed as the number of exporters times the average exports per …rm with an average productivity above' od :
where N od is the number of exporting …rms (the extensive margin of trade) and e od is the average value per shipment (the intensive margin of trade). Adopting Hummels and Klenow (2005) terminology, the extensive margin is de…ned by the number of exporting …rms, which in our model is equal to the number of goods/varieties traded. The intensive margin is accordingly de…ned by the size of exporters, which in our model is equal to the size of …rm exports. Substituting equations (12) and (14) into equation (15), total exports, E od , in manufacturing sector x from origin country o to destination country d can be expressed as:
Extensive margin (16) According to equation (16), the aggregate exports from origin country o to destination country d depend on the relative size of countries, Lr L , on destination country d's multilateral resistance, d , and on bilateral transport costs (both …xed and variable) among the trading partners. As in equation (15), aggregate exports, E od , may vary due to changes in average value, e od , per shipment (intensive margin of trade) or due to changes in the number of shipments, N od , (extensive margin of trade) both of which in turn may vary across destinations and co-vary with trade costs.
Discussion of the model
The right hand side explanatory variables in equation (16) are similar to the traditional explanatory variables of conventional gravity models of trade with representative …rms. Despite the underlying common gravity structure, the trade model derived in equation (16) di¤ers from gravity models with representative …rms in several respects. In this section we identify these features. In light of these di¤erences we then discuss those assumptions, which have led to these di¤erences.
First, given that in our model …rms have to pay export entry cost, trade costs may reduce quantities exported to the point that …rms can no longer cover …xed costs of exporting. Thus, our model allows for …rms from country o to choose not to export to country d, because, it is possible that no …rm in country o has productivity above the threshold, ' od , that makes exports to d pro…table, if trade barriers are su¢ ciently high. The model is therefore able to predict zero exports from o to d for some country pairs and some products. As a result, our model is consistent with zero trade ‡ows in both directions between some Balkan countries, as well as zero exports from o to d but positive exports from o to r for some other country pairs. Both types of trade patterns exist in the SEE trade data. Second, our model can predict positive trade ‡ows in both directions for some country pairs. The two-way trade ‡ows are important if we wish our model to be consistent with the two-way trade observed in trade data for the SEE economies. According to the Eurostat (2005) data, positive two-way trade ‡ows are observed for all SEE countries in our sample. Although, one-way international trade ‡ows prevail in the Balkans underlying the inter-sectoral trade pattern and the complementarity of factor endowments, the share of two-way trade signi…cant (and increasing). Considering the 1999-2004 period, similar dynamics are observed in di¤erent SEE countries, although with di¤erent intensities, pointing to the reduction of one-way trade and the increase of two-way trade, especially in vertically di¤erentiated goods (Eurostat 2005) .
Third, the elasticities with respect to trade costs are di¤erent. In gravity models with representative …rms the elasticity of exports with respect to trade costs are equal to 1. In contrast, in our model the elasticity of exports with respect to variable costs depends on the degree of …rm heterogeneity, , but not on the elasticity of substitution between manufacturing varieties, . Given that > 1, in our model the elasticity of exports with respect to variable trade barriers, od , is larger than in the absence of …rm heterogeneity. The elasticity of exports with respect to …xed trade costs is negatively related to the elasticity of substitution, . This prediction is in stark contrast to gravity models with representative …rms. Moreover, in our model the elasticity of exports with respect to trade costs depends on the degree of …rm heterogeneity, . In more homogeneous sectors ( high) large productive …rms represent a smaller fraction of …rms. The productivity threshold moves in a region where most of the mass of …rms lies. In those sectors, aggregate exports are sensitive to changes in trade costs because many …rms exit and enter when variable trade costs ‡uctuate.
Finally, in the context of trade growth in the SEE transition economies, we are particularly interested in data requirements. The advantage of our approach is that, despite the fact that the theoretical model assumes …rm-level heterogeneity, the underlying theoretical model does not require …rm-level data to study the structure of trade growth. This stems from the fact that exporter features can be identi…ed from variations in the characteristics of trading countries. Given that for every origin country o, its exports to di¤erent destination countries vary by characteristics of importing countries, there exist su¢ cient statistics, which can be computed from aggregate data that can decompose the aggregate export volume between the SEE Balkan economies. The downside of our approach is that introducing …rm heterogeneity and …xed trade costs requires more parameters for the empirical implementation of the theoretical trade model. In particular, an additional parameter describing …rm heterogeneity is required and a parameter capturing export entry cost is required. In order to deal with increased parameter requirements, we estimate model parameters econometrically, which is done in the next section.
Parameter estimation
In the previous section we have presented the underlying trade model, which forms the theoretical basis for the empirical analysis. Before the theoretical trade model can be empirically implemented, it needs to be parameterised. Two types of parameters are required by the theoretical trade model: trade freeness and behavioural parameters.
In order to obtain numerical values of model parameters, we estimate two equations: a trade freeness equation and an alternative gravity equation of trade ‡ows. The estimated coe¢ cients of the former will provide trade cost estimates, while the latter will provide estimates for behavioural parameters.
We proceed as follows. First, we derive an empirically estimable trade freeness equation. Next, we estimate the freeness of trade for selected SEE economies. Second, we use the theoretical trade model, which we have presented in the previous section, to derive an empirically estimable gravity model of bilateral trade ‡ows. The gravity model of trade is estimated econometrically and the results are presented in section 4.4.
Trade cost speci…cation
One of the key explanatory variables in the underlying theoretical trade model are inter-regional trade costs. The theoretical trade model distinguishes between two types of trade costs: variable trade cost, od , and …xed trade cost, F C od . Given that the true trade costs are unobservable in the SEE transition economies, we follow Head and Mayer (2004), which proposed an alternative measure of trade costs. They propose that trade costs can be proxied by the trade freeness. According to Head and Mayer, the index of trade freeness, od , captures the easiness with which two countries participate in reciprocal trade and is de…ned as od = 1 od . 16 Given that > 1, trade freeness is inversely related to trade costs.
However, given that in the underlying theoretical trade model manufacturing …rms face two di¤erent trade costs, we cannot straightforwardly apply the Head and Mayer (2004) de…nition of trade freeness. Instead, we need to derive a measure of trade freeness, which would be consistent with the underlying theoretical framework. According to our theoretical trade model, the composite measure of trade freeness is de…ned as
. Thus, our measure is di¤erent from the Head and Mayer trade freeness measure in two respects. First, our measure, od , accounts for both …xed and variable trade costs. Second, the elasticities which relate the trade freeness to trade costs are di¤erent.
A structural estimation of the index of trade freeness, od , is extremely data demanding and cannot be performed even for the old EU member states, where the statistical data base is considerably more developed than for transition economies in Eastern Europe. In order to cope with data limitations, Head and Mayer (2004) suggested that calculation of the trade freeness index, od , can be facilitated by making two simplifying assumptions: symmetric trade costs for external trade ( od = do ) and zero trade costs for trade within countries ( rr = 1).
Because of data limitations in the SEE transition economies, in this study we can only calculate the 'reduced form' of trade freeness, od . In view of SEE, the …rst assumption is not critical for countries in our sample, because none of the included Balkan economies has a signi…cant geographical advantage or disadvantage, which could asymmetrically a¤ect bilateral trade ‡ows. The second assumption might become critical under certain circumstances. In particular, internal trade costs usually increase with size of the country. Consequently, when trade costs arise only for crossborder transactions, trade freeness might be underestimated, suggesting lower levels of trade integration. Thus, from the economic geography's perspective, the estimated trade freeness might potentially be upward biased for geographically large countries, such as Bulgaria and Romania.
According to Head and Mayer (2004) , assuming frictionless intranational trade and symmetric trade costs for bilateral trade, the index of country trade freeness, od , can be calculated as follows:
where od is the trade freeness index, E od is value of goods and services exports from origin country o to destination country d and E do captures exports from d to o. Denominator factors E oo and E dd are exporting and importing countries domestic sales. They are calculated as the value of all shipments of an industry minus the sum of shipments to all other countries (exports).
Two-way parameter restrictions need to be imposed, when estimating equation (17): the trade freeness estimates,^ od , need to be bounded both from above and from below. These restrictions imply that the estimated trade freeness can only take values between zero and one, 0 < od < 1, with 0 denoting prohibitive trade costs and 1 denoting free trade. 17 
Trade ‡ow speci…cation
In this section we specify an econometrically estimable gravity model of bilateral trade ‡ows. The departure point of the empirical speci…cation is equation (16) , which suggests a trade model with exports, E od , as the dependent variable and, the relative market sizes, bilateral trade costs and country multilateral resistance as explanatory variables. Plugging equation (13) into equation (16) and collecting terms we obtain the following equation for export ‡ows:
According to equation (18) , aggregate exports from origin country o to destination country d is determined by the relative size of countries, Lr L , the destination country 17 Theoretically, the trade freeness index could be larger than 1, if the external trade of both trading partners is larger than internal trade. However, this is not an issue in the SEE trade.
d's multilateral resistance, d , the variable trade costs, od , and by the …xed trade costs, F C od .
The empirical estimation of equation (18) faces several complications. In particular, we identify two issues: the potential endogeneity of the right-hand side explanatory variables and the omitted variables bias. In the following we discuss these two estimation issues and propose solutions how do we deal with them.
We start with the potential endogeneity problems. According to the underlying theoretical trade model, the endogeneity of explanatory variables might be caused in at least two ways. First, export ‡ows might potentially give rise to adjustments in the explanatory variables, i.e. reverse causality. For example, labour demand in country o is an increasing function of exports from country o. Second, in the SEE transition economies there may exist confounding factors, such as macroeconomic shocks and structural adjustments, which might contemporaneously a¤ect both sectoral employment and export ‡ows. For instance, a negative income shock through the Balkan wars may induce emigration and, at the same time, reduce export demand within SEE.
The potential endogeneity of explanatory variables implies that equation (18), will likely yield biased and inconsistent estimates. We use two di¤erent approaches to get around the endogeneity problems. First, we consider relative export ‡ows instead of gross exports, i.e., we estimate the ratio of gross exports from country o to country d with respect to to exports from country d to country o. This transformation allows us to substitute out the sectoral labour demand, L o , which is a major source of endogeneity in equation (18) . 18 Second, we follow Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000) and use instrumental variables with lagged values of right-hand side explanatory variables as 'instruments'. 19 Thus, we implicitly assume that exporting decision at date t are determined from a comparison of potential pro…ts and costs at date t 1. We restrict the number of lags to one in order not to loose further time-series observations. For the instrumental variables estimation we need to assume that instruments are predetermined, and export ‡ows and confounding factors in residuals only affect contemporaneous and future labour force supply in exporting and in importing countries.
After these two transformations we obtain the following equation of export ‡ows:
where 4E od
are relative exports from country o to country d, 4F C od
is the ratio of export entry costs and
is the ratio of multilateral resistance between origin country o and destination country d. Although, none of the right hand side variables in (19) are directly observable in the data, they all can be calculated from statistical data which is available. The dependent variable, 4E od , can be straightforwardly calculated from the bilateral exports between o and d, and d and o. The two explanatory variables are unobservable, but can be calculated on the basis of observable variables. Given that the ratio of …xed trade costs, 4F C od , is equal to the pro…t ratio, 4 od , it can be calculated from the …rm pro…t data, which is available in the SEE data. 21 The other explanatory variable in equation (19) is the ratio of multilateral resistance between origin region o and destination region d. It can be calculated according its de…nition ( r P R r=1 Lr L rd ) using data for the regional labour endowment and the trade freeness estimates.
Obviously, beyond the included explanatory variables, unobservable economic and non-economic characteristics of regions, such as amenities, also play an important role in exporting decisions of …rms. According to previous research (e.g. Mátyás 1998, Egger 2000), there are several reasons to assume that country-speci…c …xed e¤ects are relevant when geographical, political or historical determinants that could drive or hamper trade ‡ows are present. These factors are deterministically linked to countryspeci…c characteristics and cannot consequently be considered as random. Failing to account for the unobserved cross-section heterogeneity would yield biased estimates.
Following these …ndings, we explicitly account for country pair-speci…c e¤ects, which -as emphasised by Arellano and Honoré (2001) -should reduce the heterogeneity bias. More precisely, in order to avoid potential misspeci…cation problems due to omitted variables, we include a constant term of country-speci…c characteristics and use the …xed e¤ects estimator. According to previous panel data studies of trade ‡ows, which estimate gravity model using panel data estimators, in order to obtain an e¢ cient estimator, instead of using one dummy variable per country, individual country pair dummies (…xed e¤ects) should preferentially be included in the econometric model (Anderson and Wincoop 2003) . Following these …ndings, we include a time invariant constant term, od , which captures …xed e¤ects between exporting country o and importing country d, among the right hand side explanatory variables in equation (19) .
Applying a logarithmic transformation to equation (19) and introducing the time reference, we obtain the following linearly estimable gravity equation of export ‡ows from origin country o to destination country d:
where 1 is intercept and 2 and 3 are the coe¢ cients to estimate, od is a time invariant constant term capturing country-pair speci…c …xed e¤ects and od is a random prediction error. According to equation (20) , exports from country o to 21 Using equations (6), (10) and (11), we can express average pro…ts of exporting from country o to country d, as a constant mark-up over …xed trade costs: od = F C od where = is the mark-up. The mark-up cancels out, when we take the ratios of …xed costs and pro…ts. country d are determined by …xed trade costs and the multilateral resistance in importing country o and exporting country d. These e¤ects are ampli…ed by the degree of …rm concentration (heterogeneity) and by the degree of product di¤erentiation (substitutability).
The inclusion of …xed e¤ects does not allow estimation of time-invariant explanatory variables, which enter also into the …xed e¤ects. 22 This implies that we will not be able to identify the time-invariant explanatory variables in equation (20) . Analysing the right hand side explanatory variables in equation (20) we note that the …rst term capturing …xed trade costs, 4F C od , is calculated on the basis of …rms pro…ts, 4 od . According to the …rm-level tax data, the pro…ts of exporting …rms vary considerably over time without a clear trend in the Balkans. The index of trade freeness, od , which we use as a proxy for trade costs is also time-variant (see Figure 1 in section 4.3); according to our estimates, the SEE trade freeness has almost doubled since the end of the Balkan wars. Given that the multilateral trade resistance, d , is calculated on the basis of two time-variant variables, it is time-variant too. 23 We may conclude that the inclusion of …xed e¤ects is not an issue for our model, because all right-hand side explanatory variables in equation (20) are time-variant.
In order the …xed e¤ects estimator to be unbiased, we need to assume that explanatory variables, 4F C odt 1 and 4 dot 1 , are strictly exogenous conditional on time invariant constant, od . In order to test for endogeneity we add next year's explanatory variables (in logarithmic form) and run a robust t-test. In doing so we lose the last year of the data. Both coe¢ cients are very small, -0.059 and -0.0471 and the t-statistic is only -0.018. From the robust t-test results, we may conclude there is no evidence against the strict exogeneity assumption.
In order to ensure that the …xed e¤ects estimator is well behaved asymptotically, we need a standard rank condition on the matrix of time-demeaned explanatory variables. In order to ensure that the …xed e¤ects estimator is e¢ cient, we need to assume that the conditional variances are constant and the conditional covariances are zero. While the heteroscedasticity in time-demeaned errors, • odt , might be a potential problem, serial correlation is likely to be less important. Because of the time demeaning, the serial correlation in the time-demeaned errors, • odt , under the latter assumption causes only minor complications.
Finally, in order to ensure that the obtained parameters are consistent with the theoretical trade model, we need to impose parameter restrictions implied by the theoretical trade model. Equation (20) contains two key parameters of the underlying theoretical trade model ( 2 = 1
Estimation results: trade costs
We begin by presenting the estimation results for trade costs between the SEE Balkan economies. Before presenting the estimation results, we brie ‡y discuss data, which we use for estimating the trade freeness.
Our sample consists of eight SEE economies -Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia & Montenegro. 24 The time period covered spans 1999 to 2004. Given that no reliable international bilateral trade statistics exist for such geographic coverage and time period, we had to draw on national trade statistics data on bilateral export ‡ows. 25 Although cumbersome, mapping of trade data provided by national statistical o¢ ces is the only way to obtain complete statistical information for the SEE bilateral trade. Given that SEE economies use their own national currencies, the obtained export values need to be converted in one currency. We calculate all ‡ows in Euros, as since 2003 the SEE national statistical resources report all international statistics not only in national currencies, but also in Euros.
As a result, we obtain eight equally sized panels each containing 48 observations (8 countries 6 years). Using this data we estimate the index of trade freeness, od , according to equation (17) for each SEE country. The obtained trade freeness estimates are reported in Figure 1 , where the trade freeness estimates, od , are on the vertical axis and time span is on the horizontal axis.
Given that the measure of trade freeness, od , is negatively related to trade costs with 0 denoting prohibitive trade costs and 1 free trade, estimates in Figure 1 suggest that the overall level of trade freeness is very low in the SEE economies. Although, these countries are known for their high levels of the formal trade integration since the end of the Balkan wars in 1999 (there exist a network of 31 bilateral FTAs), the estimated trade freeness is lower than 0.1 (SEE average). This indicates that less that 10% of the total trade in the SEE crosses national borders.
These estimates are very low compared to the Head and Mayer (2004) The second attribute, which can be taken from Figure 1 , is that the SEE trade freeness has increased between 1999 and 2004. On average, trade freeness has increased by almost one third from 0.066 to 0.084. Moreover, the estimates reported in Figure 1 suggest that the trade freeness has increased at di¤erent growth rates within SEE. The most sizeable increase in the regional trade freeness we have estimated for Albania (+86.4%), Romania (+85.3%) and Moldova (+85.0%). According to the same estimates, the bilateral trade freeness has increased least rapidly in The obtained trade freeness estimates can be used for both to estimate the gravity model of trade ‡ows and to empirically implement the theoretical trade model for policy simulations. These estimates also allow us to draw several conclusions, which are relevant for both applications: (i) compared to the EU internal trade, trade freeness is still very low in the SEE countries; (ii) trade freeness is increasing rapidly (SEE average +77.5% in the period 1999 to 2004) and increasing with an increasing rate, which implies that the inclusion of the trade freeness estimates among the explanatory variables in the gravity model of trade might lead to non-stationarity problems; and (iii) because of (i) and (ii), the proposed BFTA has large potential in increasing trade openness and facilitating regional trade in the Balkans.
Estimation results: trade ‡ows
In this section we estimate the gravity equation of trade (20) using panel data for eight SEE countries -Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro. As above, the time series in our data goes from 1999 to 2004. Given that we only consider bilateral trade ‡ows among the SEE countries, the cross-section dimension of our data is equal to eight. Similarly to the trade freeness estimations reported in the previous section, our data allows to build eight equally sized panels with 48 observations in each panel. Lagging explanatory variables by one year reduces the number of observations per panel to 40 (8 countries 5 years). Estimation of equation (20) requires time series cross section data of bilateral trade ‡ows, E od , …rm pro…t data and multilateral resistance variable, d . Calculation of the multilateral resistance requires data for trade freeness, od , supply of labour force in each country, L r , and the total labour force, L. Data sources for export ‡ows have already been detailed in the previous section. Firm pro…t data are drawn from national tax registers, which are available on yearly basis for all SEE countries in our sample. Numerical values for importer and exporter multilateral resistance, r , are calculated by drawing the supply of labour force in each country, L r , and the total labour force, L, from the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies Regression results for the …xed e¤ects model are presented in Table 1 . According to Table 1 Are these results in line with our expectations and previous trade studies on Balkans? Given that the relationship between explanatory and dependent variables in equation (20) is non-linear, and coe¢ cient 2 is non-linear in structural parameters, is not straightforward to answer the consistency question. According to the underlying theoretical model, exports are decreasing in …xed trade costs, F C od . This implies that the ratio of export ‡ows, 4E odt , is also decreasing in the ratio of …xed costs, 4F C od . I.e., the lower are …xed export costs from origin country o to destination country d in terms of …xed costs from d to o, the higher are exports from o to d and vice versa. Thus, for those countries, where coe¢ cient 2 estimates are negative, the total impact of the …rst right-hand side term on exports ‡ows is consistent with the underlying theory. This is true for all countries in our sample. We conclude that our estimates are in line with the underlying theoretical trade model. The other explanatory variable, which has been regressed on export ‡ows, is the multilateral resistance, r . According to Table 1 , bilateral export ‡ows are positively a¤ected by the multilateral resistance -coe¢ cient 3 estimates are positive for all countries in our sample. Given that all estimated 3 coe¢ cients are larger than one, the multilateral trade resistance raises trade at an increasing rate. The cross-section variation of coe¢ cient 3 estimates is higher compared to 2 . Signs of the estimated impact of the multilateral resistance are in line with the underlying theoretical trade model and with previous gravity studies (e.g. Anderson and Wincoop 2003). y signi…cant at 95% level, yy signi…cant at 99% level.
As usual, we test the robustness with respect to the choice of estimator and the underlying assumptions. First, we estimate equation (20) using contemporaneous values of explanatory variables. On average, this reduces the numerical values of coe¢ cients by one third, but does not change signs of the estimated coe¢ cients. Testing the idiosyncratic errors for serial correlation is more tricky, as we cannot estimate odt . Because of the time demeaning used in …xed e¤ects, we can only estimate the time-demeaned errors, • odt . Given the relatively short time dimension of our panel, we neglect this issue in the empirical analysis.
From the estimated coe¢ cients we can calculate parameter values for the theoretical trade model. More precisely, from 2 estimates we obtain values for the elasticity of substitution, r , where r = 1 2 + 1, with 6 = 0^1 ( 
BFTA impact on trade in the Balkans
In the previous two sections we have presented the theoretical trade model and estimated parameters which are required for empirical implementation of the theoretical trade model. In this section we substitute the estimated parameters into the theoretical trade model and drawing on statistical data for the base year we apply the model for assessing impacts of the proposed trade integration in the Balkans. More precisely, we perform simulation experiments of the proposed Balkan Free Trade Agreement by simulating three hypothetical policy scenarios. Beyond quantifying the aggregate impact on trade ‡ows, our trade model also allows for decomposing the aggregate trade growth into two separate components -the intensive margin of trade and the extensive margin of trade growth. Using the base year data for regional employment, L r , total employment, L, bilateral trade costs (variable trade costs, od , and …xed trade costs, F C od ), multilateral trade resistance, d , and the estimated model parameters, we are able to empirically implement and solve the model for the general trade equilibrium. In the context of the present study we are particularly interested in export ‡ows, E od , and its components N od and e od , which are calculated according to equations (12) , (14) and (16) . Given that these equations do not contain any endogenous variables, we can straightforwardly plug equation (13) into equations (12), (14) and (16) and solve the model for the general trade equilibrium.
Empirical implementation
By implementing the theoretical trade model empirically and solving for the longrun trade equilibrium, we obtain a set of endogenous variables, which we call the base run equilibrium. In order to assess robustness of these results, we compare the obtained base run values of endogenous variables with those observed in the base year data. Comparing the obtained results with statistical data suggests that our model has not been able to exactly replicate the statistically observed trade in 2004. 26 However, the simulated trade ‡ows are of the same order of magnitude as the corresponding values recorded in the SEE statistical data. 27 
Impact of declining trade barriers
In order to study the impacts of the proposed BFTA, in this section we perform ex ante simulations of alternative trade policy scenarios. Given that the exact magnitude of the e¤ective reduction of trade barriers is not known a priori, we set up hypothetical trade policy liberalisation scenarios, in which the potential impacts of the proposed trade integration in the Balkans can be studied. In order to facilitate the identi…cation of changes in the two di¤erent trade margins (the intensive margin and the extensive margin of trade), three alternative trade policy liberalisation scenarios are constructed. First, we reduce both the variable and the …xed trade costs in 10% steps up to 30%, which corresponds to 70% of the initial trade cost values. Second, we simulate …xed trade cost reduction in the same order of magnitude. In a third scenario we reduce the per unit (variable) trade costs in 10% steps up to 30%. The obtained simulation results are reported in Tables 2-4 . We start with presenting the aggregate impacts on export ‡ows. Simulation results reported in Table 2 suggest that a 10% reduction in both variable and …xed trade costs have a positive and large impact on trade ‡ows. In terms of the total export value (row E od in Table 2 ) our model predicts sizable trade gains. These results are in line with previous studies of trade liberalisation in South Eastern Europe (Stubos and Tsikripis 2007). According to our simulations, if both …xed and variable trade costs were reduced by the same percentage, then the largest gainers from trade integration were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Romania. The estimated trade gains are di¤erent across the SEE countries ranging from +149.8% in Moldova to +208.2% in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The aggregate impact of declining trade barriers on the export value is not only sizable, it is also larger than the impact of the same trade barriers estimated in trade models with representative …rms (Messerlin and Miroudot 2004, Bussiere, Fidrmuc and Schnatz 2004) . In our study the impact of trade integration is larger because, in addition to adjustments in the intensive margin of trade, which is well captured in trade models with representative …rms, our model also captures adjustments in the extensive margin of trade. According to simulation results reported in Table 2 , when both …xed and variable trade costs are reduced by the same percentage, adjustments in the extensive margin of trade are even more signi…cant than adjustments in the intensive margin of trade in the SEE economies. In trade models with representative …rms, when trade barriers decline, each …rm exports more. In our model, however, in addition to larger average shipments per each existing …rm, new …rms would enter foreign markets and start exporting. Our simulation results suggest that the entry ical ties, cultural preferences), which are not captured in our model, our predictions deviate from the base year statistical data. 27 For the base year (2004) the correlation is rather high (R 2 = 0:871). ---------------------------- Table 2 ). According to previous studies, the aggregate trade growth might be more or less valuable for trading partners because the induced welfare impacts depend on how exactly does the trade growth occur -along the intensive or the extensive margin of trade (Hillberry and Hummels 2005, Hummels and Klenow 2005). While the ability to account for these aspects is one of the main strengths of our approach, data limitations do not allow us to perform more detailed welfare analysis along sectoral, regional and socio-economic trade components, which is a promising avenue for future research.
Our results suggest that if trade growth along the extensive margin is more valuable than trade growth along the intensive margin, then the largest gainers from the trade integration in the Balkans were Serbia and Montenegro. In these countries the export volume grows more than four times faster along the extensive margin than the intensive margin of trade. The export growth along the extensive margin is about twice as high as export growth along the intensive margin in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Considering these aspects, the aggregate trade growth and growth share of extensive margin, the largest gainers might turn out to be countries, which do not head any of the two categories.
Impact of variable trade barriers
In the previous section we have assessed the impact of changes in aggregate trade costs, i.e. both …xed and variable trade costs were reduced simultaneously by the same percentage. This type of analysis is done in most empirical ex-ante trade policy studies of SEE. Compared to previous trade studies our model has the advantage that, in addition to assessing the aggregate impact of trade policy integration, it allows us to investigate how separate parts of total trade costs (…xed and variable trade costs) a¤ect export growth. In this section the aggregate impact of declining trade barriers is decomposed into two separate parts: changes in export value due to declining variable trade costs and changes in export value due to declining …xed trade costs. We are interested in decomposing the aggregate impact of trade costs, because if these impacts turn out to be signi…cant and asymmetric, then trade policy implications will be di¤erent too.
In this section we perform scenario simulations of reducing the per unit trade costs in 10% steps up to 30%. The obtained results are reported in Table 3 . As above, the other two rows in Table 3 (e od and N od ) separate out impacts of the two trade margins. The intensive margin (row e od in Table 3 ) reports how much each existing exporter changes the size of its exports. The extensive margin (row N od in Table 3 ) reports how much new entrants export (in the case of a reduction in trade barriers). y E od -% change in total trade ‡ows, e od -% change in the intensive margin of trade, N od -% change in the extensive margin of trade.
According to simulation results reported in Table 3 , the impact of variable trade costs reduction on aggregate export value in SEE is always positive, but smaller than the impact of reducing both variable and …xed trade costs. Decomposing the aggregate impact on exports suggests that in addition to adjusting the average export size of existing exporting …rms, the set of exporters adjusts in the SEE economies too, which ampli…es the aggregate impact of changes in variable trade costs. According to simulation results reported in Table 3 , declining variable trade costs induce not only an increase in the average size of exporters (row e od in Table 3 ), but also attract new …rms to enter foreign markets and start exporting (row N od in Table 3 ).
The simulated trade gains are di¤erent across the SEE countries ranging from +104.4% in Moldova to +166.6 in Bosnia and Herzegovina (row E od in Table 3) suggesting that in some SEE countries (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina) the responsiveness of exports with respect to variable trade barriers is considerably higher than in other Balkan economies (e.g. Moldova). The cross-country trade cost di¤erences alone would not lead to such sizeable di¤erences in trade gains (i.e. export growth). According to the underlying theoretical model, the export responsiveness with re-spect to variable trade barriers depends on the elasticity of substitution, as well as on the degree of …rm heterogeneity, . 28 In more homogeneous sectors (high ) large productive …rms represent a smaller fraction in the total set of …rms (see equation 16) implying that the productivity threshold of exporting moves to a region, where the main mass of …rms lies. As a result, in those countries with more homogenous manufacturing sectors, exports are rather sensitive to changes in variable trade costs because many …rms enter, when variable trade costs decline. These results are in line with previous studies on industry concentration in the SEE, which suggest that manufacturing industries are less concentrated in the EU accession countries (Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania) than in other SEE economies (Astrov 2001). Table 4 . y E od -% change in total trade ‡ows, e od -% change in the intensive margin of trade, N od -% change in the extensive margin of trade. 28 In trade models with representative …rms the amount exported to a given country depends on how competitive a …rm is against other foreign exporters. Di¤erences in competitiveness due to trade costs have a greater or lesser impact on trade ‡ows depending on whether the exported goods are more or less substitutable. If the exported goods are more substitutable ( k is high), the intensive margin of trade is strongly a¤ected by even tiny changes in trade barriers, implying that the elasticity of substitution, k , is the only parameter determining the adjustment speed in trade models with representative …rms.
Impact of …xed trade costs
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The simulation results reported in Table 4 suggest that …xed trade cost reduction has a positive, but a rather moderate impact on export ‡ows. On average, reducing …xed trade costs by 10 % increases the aggregate export value by only 19%. Only in Serbia and Montenegro the induced trade growth is more sizable (+25.9%).
Why do changes in …xed trade costs have a considerably smaller impact on export ‡ows compared to changes in variable trade costs? The answer can be found by considering the underlying theoretical trade model. According to equation (16) , the intensive trade margin does not respond to changes in …xed trade costs (row e od in Table 4 ). When …xed trade costs change, all adjustments work solely through the extensive margin (row N od in Table 4 ).
Although, according to HTSPE (2005), non-tari¤ trade barriers are extremely high in SEE, the resulting trade gains from reducing these barriers (i.e. …xed costs) seem to be rather limited. These results suggest that either the payo¤ of reducing non-tari¤ barriers in the SEE trade would be rather limited or that we cannot straightforwardly associate …xed trade costs with non-tari¤ trade barriers, as is usually done in empirical trade literature. In order to obtain more insights about the impact of …xed trade costs on trade ‡ows, these results urge for more empirical research on …xed trade costs.
Conclusions
In this paper we study how trade integration would a¤ect the structure of export growth in the SEE economies. By decomposing aggregate trade ‡ows into extensive and intensive margins of trade, we found that in contrast to previous SEE studies (Messerlin and Our empirical …ndings are summarised in Table 5 , which report average export growth rates for the SEE economies, when variable trade cost, od , and …xed trade cost, F C od , would decline. The results reported in Table 5 allow us to draw clear-cut policy conclusions. First, if the main policy objective is to increase the aggregate value of exports, then the most e¤ective trade liberalisation policy in the Balkans would be to reduce variable trade costs, od , by extending the proposed BFTA to areas such as improving rail and road infrastructure, with the goal to reduce per-unit shipping costs. Second, reducing solely …xed trade costs, such as non-tari¤ trade barriers and border-crossing bureaucracy, would induce only limited export growth. Therefore, …xed trade cost reduction is the second best policy option, if the main policy objective is to increase the aggregate value of exports. Third, if the main policy objective is to maintain and extend market share of a few large internationally competitive enterprises, then, depending on the relative reduction costs (governments may face di¤erent budget costs of reducing 10% variable vs. 10% …xed trade costs), the most e¤ective trade policy might be reducing …xed trade costs, F C od .
We also found that reducing variable trade costs has a quantitatively larger impact on export growth than reducing …xed trade costs by the same percentage. The largest gainers from reducing variable trade costs were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia and Romania. However, if the proposed BFTA would mainly reduce …xed costs of trade, such as non-tari¤ trade barriers, the largest gainers were Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro. These results suggest that Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania would be among the largest winners of free trade area in the Balkans under either scenario. Turning to potential de…ciencies of our approach, we identify two issues which could be further developed in future research. First, the assumptions of identical technologies across countries and proxying country size by the employed labour force need to be reconsidered. Indeed, relaxing these two assumptions in a heterogenous …rm framework would be a promising area for future research and, in the context of our study, potentially lead to di¤erent welfare implications of trade liberalisation. In fact, some progress has already been made in this area since this study was completed. For example, Bernard et al (2007) assume that in addition to heterogeneous productivity of …rms and country di¤erences in factor endowment, countries also differ in terms of relative factor abundance and industries vary in terms of relative factor intensity. Findings of Bernard et al suggest that falling trade costs induce reallocation of resources both within and across industries and countries, which magni…es the comparative advantage and creates additional welfare gains from trade. Given that these additional welfare gains of resource reallocation found by Bernard et al (2007) may be unevenly distributed between the intensive and extensive margins of trade, the Bernard et al framework might potentially lead to di¤erent welfare and policy conclusions.
The second issue which need to be addressed in future research is the consistency of econometric speci…cation with the theoretical model. Although, the reduced form model, which we estimated in section 4, is largely derived from the theoretical trade model (section 3) and most of the estimated parameter values are signi…cant and robust, the consistency of the two speci…cations might still be a critical issue. The consistency problem of the two speci…cations could be circumvented, for example, if either the reduced form gravity model would be used for the ex-ante trade policy impact analysis; or if model parameters would be estimated (calibrated) within the general equilibrium trade model. Although, both techniques are widely used in exante trade policy impact assessment studies, they su¤er from other limitations, which we discussed in above.
